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How Much Capabilitv does a Capabilities Based Force Need?
"Inside the Defense Deparfment and in MET to members of Congres, I began promoting a rationale for the Base Force, a sh8 r'rom a solely threat-based force to a threat-and capabiMy-based @rce. We might not face the old threat from the Sovief Union, I
said, but we still had to maintain cerfajn fundamental capabii'itks.
fir example, we m@ht no longer have a specHc airlift requirement to move X miiVon tons of materiel to Europe to meet a potential Soviet invasion. But we skII needed the wpabikty to move huge stores to unpreokiable trouble spo& around the world. We might no longer face the #' Guards Army acrozx the Fut'da Gap, but we &'I peeded the capabt%!y to project power elsewhere. "
-Gene/a Co/in Powell, UCS, 199d In 1990, with the Soviet threat fading, General Powell knew tt was ttme to act and lead the military past the Cold War. HIS soiutron, as noted above, was the creation of the "Base Force". Absent a clear and quantifiable threat, the Base Force focused on "capabrlitres" needed for the future. The resulting change to the Defense Department's weapons acquisition requirement's process was a major break from almost five decades of cold War "threat based" analysis.
The thesis of this paper IS that moving from threat based to capabilities based requirements has had an unexpected and profound consequence -services now have unprecedented "capability" to compete in each other's mission areas. ' Cohn Powell, My American Journey, Rallantme Books, New York, 1995, p 438 This has resulted in severe overlap in weapons acquisition, as each service competes for the new system that will allow them to demonstrate a given capability and bring along a greater relevance in the next debate on roles and missions. I shall attempt to describe the acquisition process as it was (pre 1990), the period of "capabilities discovery" (beginning in 1991), and how the following explosion of new systems has created an unexecutable Defense budget. Finally, I
shall offer a prescription on how to determine a "capabilities requirement" for tomorrow's force, and recommend specific actions that leaders could take to improve both our warfighting capability and the effectiveness of the budget. For 45 years, weapons acquisition in the Pentagon was fairly straightforward. The threat was unequivocal and quantifiable. As school children practiced "Duck and Cover" drills, our intelligence agencies gave us volumes of information on Soviet tanks, planes, atomic weapons, submarines, troops and more. Anything we didn't truly know could be modeled, usually with a healthy dose of "worst case" applied to the scenario. All those threats were then very carefully matched to our weapons acquisition strategy. Even in times of scarcity Table 1 ).
Defense Budget 1989 Budget -1994 Budget 1989 Budget 1990 Budget 1991 Budget 1992 n DOD udget (9~) "Hey! I Can Do That!"
After Desert Storm, the U.S. Navy was reviewing records of its Aegis SPY-l Radar data when it discovered something important -the SPY-l had "seen" and tracked several of the SCUD missiles Sadaam Hussein had fired at Saudi Arabia.
In the Cold War, that might have been an interesting discovery, but not one that would have attracted much attention. The U.S. Navy's fleet already had its threat -the Soviet Navy. The Army was clearly in the business of providing Missile Defense, as it had since the days of Nike AJaX, a nuclear Anti Ballistic Missile system fielded in the 1950s. But in the post-Cold War era, the Navy (and all services) stood to lose big. Unless it could document a "capability" that would clearly articulate a requirement for cruisers, the Navy's Aegis fleet was vulnerable to the budget ax. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) was a capability made in heaven -now the Navy had "discovered" a major new role for the 21% Century -how could Congress downsize the Aegis fleet when that fleet was going to provide worldwide TMD, and maybe even global National Missile Defense (NMD)?
Mmile Defense -1991 AmY Navy Table 2 Missile Defense -1995 Army Navy Tables 2 and 3 above demonstrate what can happen when mission and money are on the line. The Navy went from virtually no role in missile defense to an aggressive, top-to-bottom embrace of TMD and even NMD in less than four years. Though it may still be S-10 more years before an operational system IS fielded, the Navy has added missile defense to its daily lexicon and even has three Table 4 below. The positions put forward by both sides are depicted in Tables 4 and 5 .
Arms View TMD TAD Table 5 Regardless of which side you support, the greater issue is that the debate occurred at all. The fact that two services, both of whom presumably have literate staff officers, could be so far apart on whose Title X function TMD is demonstrates my thesis that we are well on our way to bankruptcy. Now take the three Army TMD systems, add two from the Navy and four from the USAF, and we have nine systems and three services competing for mission and money. been delayed in part due to "discovered" capabilities of those who see a mission in the money. Meanwhile the nation scatters its treasure among numerous claimants even though the "need" for missile defense is here today.
The F22 Raptor -maintaining the USAF lead Lest I be accused of picking a "niche" (Missile Defense) to demonstrate my 3 u capabilities hypothesis, let's turn to a more traditional cold war problem -air superiority. Very few would dispute that the United States Air Force is the best in the world, or will remain so for years to come. Yet the USAF is very motivated to field the F22, which is arguably the Nation's first "capabilities based" weapons program. The Air Force F22 doesn't rely on a soecific threat to Justify its existence; rather the Raptor was designed with a "basket of capabilities" to ensure U.S. dominance for decades. Even though the U.S. is absent a credible air threat for the foreseeable future, the Air Force is building the Raptor as a hedge against future potential threats to ensure we maintain a lead. The challenge becomes, however, defining just how good the F22 needs to be. During the Cold War, facing an overwhelming Soviet Air Force, the U.S. talked about Air Parity, and worked tirelessly not to "lose" the skies over Germany to the USSR. Towards the end of the Cold war, the U.S. leveraged technology, doctrine and training to attain undisputed "Air Superiority". Today, in the parlance of Joint Vision 2010, the USAF has redefined their mission to accept nothing less than "Air Dominance". 4. Have Conqress Return Part of the "Peace Dividend". Table 6 What Happens if We Don't Address "Excess" Capabilities
The answer to this question, unfortunately, IS easy to see. The Department of Defense might legitimately need SIX new systems to kill tanks -the services WIII pursue thirteen. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will not be able to stop the flood of new programs. The JROC is heavily involved in weapons acquisition, but is structurally constrained to look at program key performance parameters and cost factors, not aggregate capability across multiple services.
Eventually one or two new anti-tank programs will prove technologically unachievable; experience unacceptable delays or cost overruns, or be offered up in a deal and be killed. That will leave eleven programs covering a six-program requirement. OSD will not offer up larger budgets just because services want more programs than required, so all will have to make do with less. Production lines will never have sufficient funding to give the services an economic order quantity -price per unit WIII be astronomical. Additionally, fielding systems to the force will take 20+ years, vice the 4-6 vears each service "required" at Milestone I. Finally, by the time the last unit IS equipped, the system will be obsolete. If we take no action this is truly our opportu$y cost lost. + For the sake of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines of the year 2010, I hope we decide that this cost is too high. We are more "capable" than that.
-L 7% Michael P. Locke
